EIN: 736096909
UEI: GM4LFCJG6YP3
Audited by: Michael Green, CPA
Oversight agency: 84 [Department of Education]
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Data as of August 28, 2026
Management decision deadline — for entities that funded this organization
The FAC accepted this audit on March 10, 2026. Under 2 CFR 200.521(d), a pass-through entity that provided federal funds to this organization for this audit period must issue a management decision on these findings by September 10, 2026 (10 days from today).
What is a management decision? →FAC accepted this audit on March 28, 2025 — management decision was due September 28, 2025.
FAC accepted this audit on July 1, 2024 — management decision was due January 1, 2025.
FAC accepted this audit on August 9, 2023 — management decision was due February 9, 2024.
INTERNAL CONTROL OVER MAJOR PROGRMAS-UNAUTHORIZED PAYROLL CHANGES CRITERIA: AN EFFECTIVE INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH DETECTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE CONTROLS IN ORDER TO PREVENT MISAPPROPRIATION OF CASH AND FRAUDULENT PAYMENTS. CONDITION: STILWELL SCHOOL DID NOT HAVE A PROCEDURE IN PLACE FOR CHANGING PAYROLL INFORMATION THAT INCLUDED REQUESTING THE CHANGE TO PAYROLL ON A STANDARD FORM THAT INCLUDES AN EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AUTHORIZING THE CHANGE SIGNED IN FRONT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE EMPLOYEE AND APPROVED BY THE TREASURER. AS A RESULT, APPROXIMATELY $10,000 TO $14,000 OF PAYROLL PAYMENTS WERE MADE TO UNAUTHORIZED BANK ACCOUNTS. CAUSE AND EFFECT: THE TREASURER RECEIVED TWO EMAILS REQUESTING CHANGES TO DIRECT DEPOSIT ACCOUNT INFORMATION FROM ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, WHICH RESULTED IN THE TREASURER CHANGING THE DIRECT DEPOSIT ACCOUNT NUMBERS TO FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTS. RECOMMENDATION: WE RECOMMEND STILWELL SCHOOLS IMPLEMENT A PROCEDURE WHERE CHANGES TO PAYROLL INFORMATION MUST BE MADE IN PERSON BY COMPLETING A CHANGE FORM THAT THE EMPLOYEE SIGNS AND DATES IN ORDER TO AUTHORIZE CHANGES TO THEIR ACCOUNTS. RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL'S RESPONSE: THE SCHOOL IMPLEMENTED SUCH A PROCEDURE, AND NO LONGER ALLOWS PAYROLL CHANGES BY EMAIL.
Show full finding ▾Hide full finding ▴INTERNAL CONTROL OVER MAJOR PROGRMAS-UNAUTHORIZED PAYROLL CHANGES CRITERIA: AN EFFECTIVE INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH DETECTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE CONTROLS IN ORDER TO PREVENT MISAPPROPRIATION OF CASH AND FRAUDULENT PAYMENTS. CONDITION: STILWELL SCHOOL DID NOT HAVE A PROCEDURE IN PLACE FOR CHANGING PAYROLL INFORMATION THAT INCLUDED REQUESTING THE CHANGE TO PAYROLL ON A STANDARD FORM THAT INCLUDES AN EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AUTHORIZING THE CHANGE SIGNED IN FRONT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE EMPLOYEE AND APPROVED BY THE TREASURER. AS A RESULT, APPROXIMATELY $10,000 TO $14,000 OF PAYROLL PAYMENTS WERE MADE TO UNAUTHORIZED BANK ACCOUNTS. CAUSE AND EFFECT: THE TREASURER RECEIVED TWO EMAILS REQUESTING CHANGES TO DIRECT DEPOSIT ACCOUNT INFORMATION FROM ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, WHICH RESULTED IN THE TREASURER CHANGING THE DIRECT DEPOSIT ACCOUNT NUMBERS TO FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTS. RECOMMENDATION: WE RECOMMEND STILWELL SCHOOLS IMPLEMENT A PROCEDURE WHERE CHANGES TO PAYROLL INFORMATION MUST BE MADE IN PERSON BY COMPLETING A CHANGE FORM THAT THE EMPLOYEE SIGNS AND DATES IN ORDER TO AUTHORIZE CHANGES TO THEIR ACCOUNTS. RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL'S RESPONSE: THE SCHOOL IMPLEMENTED SUCH A PROCEDURE, AND NO LONGER ALLOWS PAYROLL CHANGES BY EMAIL.
FINDING 2022-01 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER MAJOR PROGRAMS-UNAUTHORIZED PAYROLL CHANGES. CRITERIA: AN EFFECTIVE INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH DETECTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE CONTROLS IN ORDER TO PREVENT MISAPPROPRIATION OF CASH AND FRAUDULENT PAYMENTS. CONDITION: STILWELL SCHOOL DID NOT HAVE A PROCEDURE IN PLACE FOR CHANGING PAYROLL INFORMATION THAT INCLUDED REQUESTING THE CHANGE TO PAYROLL ON A STANDARD FORM THAT INCLUDES AN EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AUTHORIZING THE CHANGE SIGNED IN FRONT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE EMPLOYEE AND APPROVED BY THE TREASURER. AS A RESULT, APPROXIMATELY $10,000 TO $14,000 OF PAYROLL PAYMENTS WERE MADE TO UNAUTHORIZED BANK ACCOUNTS. CAUSE AND EFFECT: THE TREASURER RECEIVED TWO EMAILS REQUESTING CHANGES TO DIRECT DEPOSIT ACCOUNT INFORMATION FROM ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, WHICH RESULTED IN THE TREASURER CHANGING THE DIRECT DEPOSIT ACCOUNT NUMBERS TO FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTS. RECOMMENDATION: WE RECEOMMEND STILWELL SCHOOLS IMPLEMENT A PROCEDURE WHERE CHANGES TO PAYROLL INFORMATION MUST BE MADE IN PERSON BY COMPLETING A CHANGE FORM THAT THE EMPLOYEE SIGNS AND DATES IN ORDER TO AUTHORIZE CHANGES TO THEIR ACCOUNTS. RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL'S RESPONSE: THE SCHOOL IMPLEMENTED SUCH A PROCEDURE, AND NO LONGER ALLOWS PAYROLL CHANGES BY EMAIL. CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANNED: STILWELL SCHOOLS WILL IMPLEMENT THE PROCEDURES IN PLACE THAT REQUIRES PAYROLL INFORMATION CHANGES BE MADE IN PERSON BY COMPLETING A CHANGE FORM THAT THE EMPLOYEE WILL SIGN AND DATE IN ORDER TO AUTHORIZE CHANGES TO THEIR ACCOUNTS. NAME OF CONTACT PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION: MATTHEW BRUNK-SUPERINTENDENT. ANTICIPATED COMPLETION DATE: AUGUST 9TH, 2023.
FAC accepted this audit on June 6, 2022 — management decision was due December 6, 2022.
FAC accepted this audit on April 11, 2021 — management decision was due October 11, 2021.
FAC accepted this audit on April 28, 2020 — management decision was due October 28, 2020.
FAC accepted this audit on December 17, 2018 — management decision was due June 17, 2019.
FAC accepted this audit on June 18, 2018 — management decision was due December 18, 2018.
FAC accepted this audit on April 4, 2017 — management decision was due October 4, 2017.
Data source: This information comes from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse, the official repository of Single Audit data. All data is public domain. Verify this organization's audit history at fac.gov.
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