EIN: 953853446
UEI: U6HTDKMZKHM6
Data as of August 27, 2026
Management decision deadline — for entities that funded this organization
The FAC accepted this audit on February 19, 2026. Under 2 CFR 200.521(d), a pass-through entity that provided federal funds to this organization for this audit period must issue a management decision on these findings by August 19, 2026 (8 days ago).
What is a management decision? →The lack of proper controls caused the submission of Required Audit Report to HUD REAC to be late. The Audit report was dated 11/25/2025. Thus, the REAC submission was late. Entities must adhere strictly to these deadlines to maintain compliance and funding eligibility.
Show full finding ▾Hide full finding ▴The lack of proper controls caused the submission of Required Audit Report to HUD REAC to be late. The Audit report was dated 11/25/2025. Thus, the REAC submission was late. Entities must adhere strictly to these deadlines to maintain compliance and funding eligibility.
Resources: Online HUD accounting Webinars or Self Study classes. Example AICPA, AHACPA, or Wester CPE
FAC accepted this audit on May 3, 2020 — management decision was due November 3, 2020.
Findings-Financial Statement HUD PROJECT NO. 12211231 STOVALL TERRACE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2019 Criteria Management is required to design, implement and maintain internal controls. over compliance and financial reporting. In this case the condition reflected non-material deficiency when compared to the dollar amount of the program. Statement of Condition 1. Embezzlement loss of $26,906 by Management Company Employee The scheme was to input bogus invoices from a fake vendor then also process a check and forge the signature of the Owner of the Manaement Company. The employee would then deposit the check into a bank account established in the name of the bogus vendor. 2. The Management Company did extensive research to isolate the scheme to one vendor. 3. The scheme was discovered during the auditors disbursements testing. 4. The periods affected was the fiscal year from 8/2018 to 6/2019 for the amount of $16,646 and for the period July 2017 to June 30, 2018 in the amount of $10,260. and for the month of July 2019 for the amount of $4,150. 5. The compensating control for the embezzlement was that the Owner of the Management Company signed all checks. However her signature was duplicated and forged onto the embezzled checks. Further for invoices that exceed $1,500 the owners signature was required. Here the invoices were less than $1,500. 6. The average check amount was $299 over 90 forged checks. With the highest individual check amount totaling $765. Cause 1. Breakdown in the Separations of Duties. The Management Company Employee was allowed to both enter accounts payable invoices into the Accounts Payable System and also write checks to the vendors in the cash disbursement system. 2. Neither the Accountants nor management supervisory personel recognized that the wrongfully paid vendor was not an approved vendor for the company. 3. The Owner's signature is not distinctive and easily duplicated. The signature was used by the employee to approve the invoices and also sign the check for payment to the bogus vendor possibly controlled by the Employee Effect Loss of Cash, the effect of which created a receivable from the Management Company. The result is a unauthorized distribution. Reporting Views of Responsible Officials Management agrees that their system has been changed to separate the duties of the accounts payable from the invoice paying activities. The management company has terminated the employee. The embezzlement has also been reported to local law enforcement. Context This project has been in existence since 1987 and has not had any deficiencies. This was an isolated occurance with a Management employee who was employed for 11 years. The scheme did not take place until 2017 & 2018. The employee has been terminated and the company will now follow the recommendations which should eliminate this type of defalcation from reoccuring. In prior years the Project has been considered a Low Risk Auditee.
Show full finding ▾Hide full finding ▴Findings-Financial Statement HUD PROJECT NO. 12211231 STOVALL TERRACE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2019 Criteria Management is required to design, implement and maintain internal controls. over compliance and financial reporting. In this case the condition reflected non-material deficiency when compared to the dollar amount of the program. Statement of Condition 1. Embezzlement loss of $26,906 by Management Company Employee The scheme was to input bogus invoices from a fake vendor then also process a check and forge the signature of the Owner of the Manaement Company. The employee would then deposit the check into a bank account established in the name of the bogus vendor. 2. The Management Company did extensive research to isolate the scheme to one vendor. 3. The scheme was discovered during the auditors disbursements testing. 4. The periods affected was the fiscal year from 8/2018 to 6/2019 for the amount of $16,646 and for the period July 2017 to June 30, 2018 in the amount of $10,260. and for the month of July 2019 for the amount of $4,150. 5. The compensating control for the embezzlement was that the Owner of the Management Company signed all checks. However her signature was duplicated and forged onto the embezzled checks. Further for invoices that exceed $1,500 the owners signature was required. Here the invoices were less than $1,500. 6. The average check amount was $299 over 90 forged checks. With the highest individual check amount totaling $765. Cause 1. Breakdown in the Separations of Duties. The Management Company Employee was allowed to both enter accounts payable invoices into the Accounts Payable System and also write checks to the vendors in the cash disbursement system. 2. Neither the Accountants nor management supervisory personel recognized that the wrongfully paid vendor was not an approved vendor for the company. 3. The Owner's signature is not distinctive and easily duplicated. The signature was used by the employee to approve the invoices and also sign the check for payment to the bogus vendor possibly controlled by the Employee Effect Loss of Cash, the effect of which created a receivable from the Management Company. The result is a unauthorized distribution. Reporting Views of Responsible Officials Management agrees that their system has been changed to separate the duties of the accounts payable from the invoice paying activities. The management company has terminated the employee. The embezzlement has also been reported to local law enforcement. Context This project has been in existence since 1987 and has not had any deficiencies. This was an isolated occurance with a Management employee who was employed for 11 years. The scheme did not take place until 2017 & 2018. The employee has been terminated and the company will now follow the recommendations which should eliminate this type of defalcation from reoccuring. In prior years the Project has been considered a Low Risk Auditee.
Findings-Financial Statement HUD PROJECT NO. 12211231 STOVALL TERRACE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2019 Recommendation 1. The Management Company should have and maintain a Approved Vendors list. The Approved Vendors list shall be circulated to all accounting staff. 2. Accounts Payable clerk should only be allowed to enter approved invoices from a management approved vendor list. There should be a separate clerk responsible for writing checks. 3. The General Ledger Accountants should constanly review the disbursement list for unauthorized vendors. 4. During the bank reconciliation process the Accountants should review all check signatures and investigate all irregularities. Further the Accountant should compare the payee with the authorized Vendors list. The Bank reconciliation should be signed off on by the accountant that the check review was performed. 5. A more distinctive signature is recommended by the check signor who is currently the owner of the management company. Managements Response Agree with the findings and recommendations.
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